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ABSTRACT 
Research has consistently linked organizational inertia to the failure of industry incumbents to 
prosper or even survive from periods of discontinuous change driven by technological 
entrepreneurship.  Recent work has unbundled the structure of inertia into two key determinants; 
'resource rigidities' and 'routine rigidities'.  In this study, we elaborate our understanding of the 
conditions under which these two forms of inertia are likely to occur, by drawing on the notion of 
Organizational Field Transparency, central to Institutional Theory.  We use four years of field data 
from two manufacturing cases and their 21 responses to discontinuous threats and opportunities.  We 
show that as a manager’s experience of their organizational field transparency varies (opaque, semi-
transparent, transparent, semi-hazy or hazy) so does their sensitivity to discontinuous threats and 
opportunities, along with the legitimacy and intensity of resource and routine rigidities.  We offer our 
findings as a novel conceptual progression with five two-part propositions, which also have 
implications for dealing with heterogeneity in entrepreneurship and innovation research.[1]  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Discontinuous innovations (Christensen and Bower, 1996; Tushman and Anderson, 1986) re-
shape the existing terms of economic exchange within established markets (Shane and Eckhardt, 2003) 
and are based upon entrepreneurial opportunities that require established firms to make non-linear 
internal adaptations relative to traditional trajectories of development (Christensen and Bower, 1996; 
Tushman and Anderson, 1986).  A dominant research issue in studies dealing with the phenomena of 
discontinuous innovation, in both technology entrepreneurship (Garud and Karnøe, 2003) and 
corporate entrepreneurship (Burgelman, 1983) settings, has been organizational inertia.  The presence 
of organisational inertia is observed when firms lack the capacity to internally change in response to or 
in advance of significant external change (Miller and Friesen, 1980; Tushman and Romanelli, 1985).  
Interest in inertia has been spurned by both the prevalence of industry incumbent failure (Christensen 
and Rosenbloom, 1995; Christensen, 1997) and the impact that such failure has on industry dynamics 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1977). The failure of industry incumbents to prosper from periods of 
discontinuous change has been identified in studies of punctuated equilibria (Tushman and Anderson, 
1986), technological S-curves (Foster, 1986a and 1986b), population dynamics (Hannan and Freeman, 
1977 and 1984; Wade, 1995 and 1996) and technological trajectories (Dosi, 1982).  In particular, 
scholars have highlighted the inertia of organizational development as a key factor that disables 
managers from responding to the discontinuous threats or opportunities offered by the exploitation of 
new technologies and the novel recombination of existing technologies (Dewar and Dutton, 1986; 
Henderson and Clark, 1990; Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996).  Moreover, organizational inertia appears 
to dictate trajectories of development even when explicit calls for change and technological 
entrepreneurship are made from within the firm (Johnson, 1988; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; Tushman 
and O’Reilly, 1996). 
We continue this important research tradition to understand the phenomena of organizational 
inertia.  Our point of departure is Gilbert’s (2005) distinction between inertia as 'resource rigidities', the 
“failure to change resource investment patterns” (p741) and inertia as 'routine rigidities', the “failure to 
change the organizational processes that use those resource investments” (p741).  By distinguishing 
these two determinants of inertia, Gilbert not only enhanced our understanding of the underlying 
phenomenon of organizational inertia but also explained a seemingly contradictory finding in the 
literature: that the perception of a discontinuous threat can act as a catalyst or constraint for a firm’s 
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response to discontinuous change. This said, investigations into the conditions that underpin an 
industry’s incumbents inertia have failed to distinguish between a firm’s ability to perceive threats 
and/or opportunities in the face of discontinuous change.  Recent developments in Institutional Theory 
provide an opportunity to better understand threat and opportunity perception.  In particular, the central 
concept of Organizational Fields (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott and Meyer, 1983; Scott, 2001) 
and their perceived transparency (Dorado, 2005) allow us to delineate conditions under which we 
might expect managers’ sensitivity to threats and/or opportunities to be high or low.  Hence, this paper 
presents the results of an investigation into how the managerial experience of organizational field 
transparency influences (1) the perception of discontinuous threats and opportunities and (2) the 
different determinants of inertia.  Drawing on observations from two longitudinal case studies that 
compare 21 responses to discontinuous opportunities and threats, our article elaborates current 
theoretical perspectives of organizational inertia as summarized in Figure 1.  We show that variations 
in how managers experience their organizational field transparency leads to variations their ability to 
perceive discontinuous threats and opportunities and in turn to variations in both the prevalence and 
strength of routine and resource rigidities.  
Figure 1. When managers have their eyes wide shut: unbundling the determinants of inertia to 
discontinuous innovation by elaborating the impact of organizational field transparency. 
We divide the remainder of our article into four primary sections: a theoretical background, an 
overview of our research methodology, the results of our observations, and a discussion of our results.  
Our theoretical background is divided into three parts.  Firstly, we provide an overview of the current 
understanding of organisational inertia, in conditions of discontinuous change.  Secondly, we 
demonstrate how a manager’s sensitivity to opportunities and threats depends upon their experience of 
organizational field transparency.  Finally, we demonstrate a clear gap in knowledge by outlining how 
the notion of organizational field transparency can be used to elaborate our understanding of the 
determinants of inertia to discontinuous innovation.  Our research methodology is best described as 
theory elaboration (Lee 1999; Lee, Mitchell and Sablynski, 1999); we employed a case study design, 
observing two manufactures over 4 years.  Analyses of our observations are presented in two parts, the 
first overviews a within case analysis, the second presents the results of our cross case analysis and 
encapsulates our findings in formal propositions.  Our discussion allows to assert how institutional 
theory may be used to offer significant conceptual progressions for investigations into organisational 
inertia and how it may be useful in general for scholars of technology and corporate entrepreneurship. 
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Organisational Inertia. 
Drawing from the two dominant schools of thought that seek to explain inter-firm differences - 
the resource-based (cf Wernfelt, 1984; Barney, 1986; 1991; 2001) and the-routine based (cf Nelson and 
Winter, 1982) views of the firm – scholars have looked towards resource utilization and persistent 
patterns of managerial behaviour to explain both technology entrepreneurship and underinvestment in 
discontinuous change within existing firms.  For example, the theory of resource dependency (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978), a critical resource-based contribution, is used to explain incumbent inertia by 
illustrating that a management team’s freedom of action is limited by the necessity to satisfy the needs 
of those entities outside the firm that give it the resources[2] it needs to survive. The primary providers 
of a firm’s resources are its customers and investors (Ansoff, 1965; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). As 
existing customers are unlikely to express a need for a discontinuous proposition (Leonard Barton, 
1992; Leonard, 1995; Leonard and Rayport, 1997; Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; Ulwick, 2002) and as 
investors want to see fast returns on their investment (Burgelman and Sayles, 1986), resource 
dependencies are created that focus managers’ attention and finances towards continuous improvement, 
creating an inertia against non-linear innovation (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Burgelman and Sayles, 
1986; Christensen, 1997).  Alternatively, individuals and organizations “remember by doing” (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982, p99).  They generate and follow routines - identifiable patterns of activity embodied 
in human assets and reinforced through repeated use and structural embeddedness (Nelson and Winter, 
1982; Winter 1990).  Whilst the notion of evolving routines offers a positive evolutionary perspective 
of the firm (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Langlois 1997; Feldman and Pentland, 2003), persistent 
compliance to routines often occurs because new information is not sought, which makes other types of 
behaviour inconceivable and allows embedded patterns of behaviour to become “taken for granted as 
‘the way we do things’.” (Scott, 2001: 57).  Embedded routines can create a dominant logic (Prahalad 
and Bettis, 1986) and path dependence (Penrose, 1995; Tidd et al., 1997), as such, decision choices 
regarding the future that are not framed within the context of an organization’s history are likely to be 
met with resistance (Walsh and Ungson, 1991). 
Whilst some investigations into organisational inertia reveal that the perception of a 
discontinuous threat can motivate change (e.g., Huff, Huff and Thomas, 1992; Lant, Milliken and 
Batra, 1992; Bar and Huff, 1997), others claim that the perception of a discontinuous threat will lock 
managers into focusing on previously learned activities (e.g., Dutton and Jackson, 1987; Staw, 
Sandelands and Dutton, 1981; Hartman and Nelson, 1996).  Rather than attempting to confirm or 
disconfirm these opposing views, Gilbert (2005) unites these contradictory findings by using the 
resource and routines-based views of the firm, strengthened by the notions of position reinvestment 
incentives (Arrow, 1962) and threat-motivated response (Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton, 1981) from 
economics and social-psychology respectively.  His analysis reveals that despite the common use of 
Miller and Friesen’s (1980) and Tushman and Romanelli’s (1985) work to define inertia as a unitary 
construct, researchers have been inconsistent with how they measure the phenomena: “variables that 
measure a willingness to invest financial or attention-based resources have been confused with 
variables that measure change in “dominant logic” or change in operating routines.” (Gilbert, 2005, 
p758).  He shows that the threat of discontinuous innovation was seen as a catalyst to change by those 
who were measuring resource commitments and the driver of inertia by those who measured changes in 
routines.  This analytical delineation allowed Gilbert to demonstrate that managers face two 
determinants of inertia, resource rigidities, the “failure to change resource investment patterns” 
(Gilbert, 2005, p741) and routine rigidities, the “failure to change the organizational processes that use 
those resource investments” (ibid, p741). 
The reason the two determinants of inertia move in different directions is that their underlying 
causal mechanisms are different.  Gilbert (2005) investigated the resource and routine rigidities in four 
incumbent US newspaper firms that faced the discontinuous threat posed by digital on-line media 
publications.  He demonstrates that the perception of a discontinuous threat can enable managers in 
incumbent firms to legitimately challenge resource dependencies and overcome resource rigidities.  
However, it is the firms embedded routines that simultaneously prevent managers from responding to 
such threats, in fact, his findings illustrate that a discontinuous threat is likely intensify routine 
rigidities.  This unique analysis reveals that under conditions of discontinuous change, resource and 
routine rigidities will have a differing impact on organizational development.   
Whilst Gilbert's contribution to our understanding of inertia is to be commended, it must be 
noted that it was developed, in large, using a skewed population of managers.  His investigation is 
mostly focused on mature firms, and managers who had perceived the threat of a discontinuous 
innovation but were practically blind to its opportunities.  This unit of analysis fails to consider the 
nature of inertia in organizations whose managers are more opportunity-aware or those in which both 
opportunities and threats remain hidden.  In sum, we applaud Gilbert’s work - his determinants of 
inertia represent a milestone in clarity on the subject - however, we believe that the limited scope of his 
analysis is not adequately reflected by the boundary conditions of his conclusions. 
 
Organisational field transparency and sensitivity to discontinuous opportunities and threats. 
Institutional Theory is used to explain the nexus between social pressures and management 
action.  Although the institutional perspective is most famously used to explain the isomorphism 
(similarity) and stability of organizational arrangements (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Zucker, 1977), it 
is also provides a recognized platform from which to account for organizational change (Ehrenfeld; 
2002; Dougherty, 1994; Greenwood and Hinnings, 1996; Lawrence, Winn and Jennings, 2001; Meyer, 
1982; Oliver, 1991).  Institutional theory is therefore a useful perspective to explain why, if 
entrepreneurial opportunities and threats exist prior to their discovery (Shane and Eckhardt, 2003), not 
all managers are equally capable of discovering them, or indeed acting to exploit or mitigate their 
portential.  
A primary unit of analysis in institutional research is the organizational field, a unit which 
comprises of the enterprises and actors that, in general, constitute the recognized area of institutional 
life (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  Organizational fields only exist to the extent that they are 
institutionally defined, in that a mutual awareness of roles and responsibilities has emerged between 
groups of participants involved in a common enterprise (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p148).  
Organisational fields can therefore be described in terms of webs of “…values, norms, rules, beliefs, 
and taken for granted assumptions, that are at least partially of [the actors] own making” (Barley and 
Tolbert, 1997, p93).  An emerging institutionalized organizational field will simultaneously enable and 
constrain the activities of the managers involved, limiting the opportunities and threats that they 
perceive and to which they respond.  Hence, organisational fields and the processes of 
institutionalization are important to the topic of technology entrepreneurship as they increase the 
probability of certain types of behaviour, to a greater or lesser degree, by setting bounds on rationality 
and restricting the opportunities and alternatives that actors see.  As completely bounded rationality is 
rare (Barley and Tolbert, 1997; Zucker, 1977), institutionalization can instead be seen as a variable: "... 
the greater the degree of institutionalization, the greater the conformity of cultural understandings, the 
greater the degree of maintenance [of the existing status quo] without direct social control, and the 
greater the resistance to change..." (Zucker, 1977, p742).  Hence, not only does the institutional 
perspective enable a better understanding of the process by which patterns of action develop, gain 
embeddedness and even become taken for granted as correct (Meyer, Boli and Thomas, 1987, p13) but 
it responds to the growing rejection of theories that place the desire for efficiency as the key driver of 
decision-making.  In fact, institutionalists reject propositions that attribute variations in formal 
structures to purely rational insights regarding technical and environmental conditions (Scott, 2001). 
This perspective demonstrates why actors who seek to deliver non-linear adaptations will be 
confounded by highly institutionalized organizational fields (DiMaggio 1988; Barley and Tolbert 1997) 
and the resultant power structures held by political elites (Lukes, 1974).  As the more highly 
institutionalized a social system becomes, the more patterns of behaviour become entrenched in 
everyday life and remain unchallenged (Zucker, 1977).  In sum, the accumulated acceptance of norms 
generates a momentum that harnesses the inputs and actions of distributed managers. 
Organisational fields can be conceptualized has having a varying degree of constituent 
multiplicity (Oliver, 1991).  The degree of multiplicity experienced by managers refers to the extent to 
which managers are tightly coupled to their organizational field and insulated from ideas practiced in 
other sectors and, conversely, the extent to which they are uncoupled from their the recognized area of 
institutional life and exposed to and receptive of the routines, customs and resources of other fields 
(Greenwood and Hinings 1996: 1023; Whittington 1992; Seo and Creed, 2002).  Managers who 
experience a high degree of multiplicity will be exposed to a large number of institutional referents, 
some of which will overlap and compliment and others that will conflict.  “Conflicting pressures 
preclude organizational conformity to the institutional environment in its entirety…”  (Oliver, 1991, p 
163), in fact, “social forces do not so much smother managerial agency as enable it.” (Whittington, 
1992:707).  Hence, institutionalists also demonstrate that in fields where managers are open to the 
tension between conflicting institutional structures, change can be mustered and new arrangements 
developed by actively exploiting divergence (Giddens 1991; Seo and Creed, 2002; Whittington, 1992). 
Dorado (2005) utilises the constructs of institutionalisation and multiplicity to theorize that a 
manager’s ability to perceive opportunities and threats and their capacity to mobilize resources to 
exploit them is dependent upon organizational field transparency.  She demonstrates that the 
transparency of opportunities (and by default threats) within a field varies with managers exposure to 
multiplicity and with the field’s degree of institutionalization.  She asserts that organizational fields can 
be experienced in one of three dominant forms (p394).  Organisational fields can be ‘opaque’ in which 
the field is closed, highly isolated and/or highly institutionalized, where opportunities and threats will 
appear almost absent and the ability to access resources to support them will be almost impossible.  
Organisational fields can also be ‘transparent’, in which the field is experienced as open, with several 
institutional referents in a substantially institutionalized context, where opportunities and threats will 
appear plentiful and where actors will be able both to define new institutional arrangements and to gain 
support to respond to them.  Finally, managers can experience their organisational field as ‘hazy’.  Such 
fields managers are exposed to extreme multiplicity, they perceive their field as highly unpredictable 
and highly complex; moreover, opportunities and threats are likely to be out of grasp of managers who 
will be hard pressed to make sense of and/or bring order to their problematic environment.  Institutional 
Theory can, therefore, be used to demonstrate that potentially discontinuous innovations can be 
regarded as objective opportunities and threats within organizational fields, the transparency of which 
are dependent upon managerial experience of institutionalization and multiplicity. 
 
Elaboration of the impact of organizational field transparency on the determinants of inertia. 
There is a persistent failure in the literature to link organisational inertia and discontinuous 
innovation with insights from institutional theory.  For example, an appraisal of Gilbert’s (2005) 
ground-breaking study, through Dorado’s (2005) lens of organisational field transparency, allows us to 
see that the managers he observed were exposed to high levels of institutionalization and were 
insensitive to the opportunities posed by discontinuous change but sensitive to the threats.  Hence, 
Gilbert's analysis unbundled the determinants of inertia in a context where managers’ experience of 
their organizational field appeared to lie somewhere between opaque and transparent - perhaps within a 
'semi-transparent' intermediary field.  We assert therefore that it is necessary to conduct a broader 
analysis of organizational inertia across the full spectrum of the organizational field transparency. 
Moreover, although institutionalists directly link institutional entrepreneurship with two parallel 
conditions - (1) where managers are exposed to the creative tension generated when individuals witness 
practices and resources from other fields and (2) to levels of institutionalization that are both flexible 
enough to be challenged but rigid enough to facilitate means-ends calculations regarding change – they 
fail to directly explore inertia with the subject discontinuous innovation.  Although Dorado’s (2005) 
theorising can be used to explore the impact of three forms of organisational field transparency, she 
offers no operationalisation of these constructs and is yet to explore the space between each of the these 
primary experiences.   
In conclusion, our understanding of incumbent inertia can be refined by answering the following 
research question: how does the experience of organizational field transparency influence (1) the 
perception of discontinuous threats and opportunities and (2) the different determinants of inertia? 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
As the aim of this investigation was to offer a sharper conception of how and why organizational 
inertia inhibits the pursuit of discontinuous innovation, the methodology developed and employed is 
best described as theory elaboration (Lee 1999; Lee Mitchell and Sablynski, 1999), using a case study 
design (Yin, 1984; Eisenhardt, 1986; Silverman, 2000). 
Case Selection 
Case selection criteria were developed based upon theoretical distinctions (Glaser and Straus, 
1967; Eisenhardt, 1989; Silverman, 1999).  It was decided to select one established, small-medium 
sized manufacturer and one established, large manufacture, both in possession of a broad portfolio of 
core and non-core products.  Both cases were to be average performers in their industries, although a 
prior track record for innovative capacity was preferable.  It was also determined that both cases must 
have recently ignited a renewed focus on technology entrepreneurship.   
A list of potential firms was provided by the IST directorate of the European Commission and 
two were deemed appropriate to be observed over a 4 year period.  In addition, both had recently lost a 
core product to an overlooked discontinuous threat which was at the root of their renewed efforts to 
restore success.  To protect the confidentiality of the cases, we present them as Case A (the small 
manufacturer) and Case B (the large manufacturer) and disguise or omit the explicit sources of their 
threats and opportunities. 
Data sources 
In total, ninety managers took part in our research, from which a core group of 14 managers 
were consistently and regularly involved.  The participants formed two broad groups: the first was 
‘executive managers’, with responsibility for vision and strategy and who were answerable to 
shareholders and influential stakeholders, the second was ‘operational managers’, which consisted of 
those who drove the firm’s action-producing processes.  Data were collected from primary and 
secondary sources.  Primary data were gathered from both executive and operational managers, via 
interviews and both formal and informal observations – formal observations included within-case and 
cross-case workshops and guided business tours; informal observations included ‘water-cooler 
conversations’, ‘hallway chats’ and ‘fly-on-the-wall’ meetings.  Secondary data were collected in the 
form of archival documents, which included internal reports, internal memorandums, news reports and 
industry statistics.  In total, we gathered data from 10 workshops (each taking 1-3 days, within single 
case or cross-case settings, attended by cross functional, multi-level senior staff), 8 guided tours, 5 ‘fly 
on wall’ meetings, industry monitoring (2001-2005), 20 interviews (face to face and telephone - 
recorded and transcribed), and 198 archival documents (plus email conversations). 
Primary data collection areas 
To conduct our investigation we used guidance from institutional theory and the literature on 
innovation and entrepreneurship - this paper reports on the insights gained from our longitudinal 
monitoring and analysis of each cases’ new product/service development effort, process innovation and 
entrepreneurial business model activities.  Hence, we monitored the two chief determinants of a 
manager’s experience of organizational field transparency: their perceived degree of institutionalization 
(Zucker, 1977) and their perceived level of constituent multiplicity (Oliver, 1991).  In parallel, we 
monitored variance in sensitivity to discontinuous opportunities and threats and variance in the cases’ 
resource and routine rigidities when innovating.  Synthesis of these observations has generated insights 
regarding the relationship that multiplicity and institutionalization have with the capacity of managers 
to identify and deliver discontinuous innovation and the organizational inertia that inhibits it.   
To operationalise an assessment of managers perception of ‘institutionalization’ we turned to 
descriptions made by Zucker (1977), Hannan and Freeman (1989), DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and 
Oliver (1991).  Likewise, we turned to the work of Greenwood and Hinings (1996, p1023), Whittington 
(1992), Seo and Creed, (2002) when operationalizing our assessments of each case study’s level of 
multiplicity.  Without sight of an end result, a statement of outcome resulting from a potential or 
missed threat or opportunity would be speculative at best. Therefore we report on the analysis of 21 
products/projects, all of which were responding to or being impacted by discontinuous change, from 
which statements of outcome could be made at the time of writing of this paper.  Sensitivity to 
discontinuous threats was recorded as such when participants referred to the negative effect of market 
changes, new market entrants or new technologies within their organizational fields.  Similarly, 
sensitivity to discontinuous opportunities was recorded as such when participants referred to the 
positive effect of market changes, new technologies or the potential to introduce new market entrants 
within their organizational field.  We adopted Gilbert’s (2005) assessment protocol to observe resource 
and routine rigidities  
Data analysis process 
Data were collected from both cases A and B over the same four year period.  Instead of offering 
an analysis of convenient, linear, periodic time blocks, we present an analysis clustered around events 
or periods of stark operational changes in each case study site (Lawrence, Winn, and Jennings (2001, 
p626), a practice also supported by Clark (1985).  We first collected historical data to contextualize the 
initial conditions of each case study (Dyer and Wilkins, 1991; Eisenhardt, 1989) and the subsequent 
data were codified into event-driven or operational phases within each firm.  To better understand the 
data within each phase, we adopted coding and structuring of data, enfolding of literature, within and 
cross-case comparisons, eliciting confirming and disconfirming information and the generation a 
replication logic as recommended by Eisenhardt (1986), Glaser and Straus (1967), Miles and 
Huberman (1994) and Yin (1994).  Two key forms of validity were employed: (1) communicative 
validity and (2) pragmatic validity (Sandberg, 2005).  Consequently, the data sets were also analysed 
by a second party who was related to but not completely involved in the research program.  Their 
coding results either directly replicated and confirmed the segmentations and clusters revealed by the 
primary author or they offered an initially disconfirming perspective that was used to refine and/or re-
clarify the findings presented in this paper. 
 
RESULTS 
We first collected historical data to contextualize the initial conditions of each case study (Dyer 
and Wilkins, 1991; Eisenhardt, 1989).  The subsequent four years of data on each case’s process and 
business model innovations and new product/service development outputs were codified into case 
specific event-driven phases (Lawrence, Winn, and Jennings, 2001).  Case A’s and B’s data were 
clustered into five and four further phases respectively, neither cases’ segmentation of linear time 
progression mapped onto the other.  In this section, we present our analysis of the longitudinal data in 
two main parts.  In the first part, we outline the ‘story’ of each case and present how managers 
experienced their organizational field transparency, how their sensitivity to discontinuous opportunities 
and threats varied throughout the study, and the prevalence of resource and routine rigidities (Figure 2, 
towards the end of this section, presents a supportive data summary).  In the second part, we present the 
results of our cross case analysis.  We note here that managers in both cases experienced their 
organisational field in each of the forms that Dorado (2005) predicts (opaque, transparent and hazy) 
and our evidence strongly suggests the existence of at least two intermediary fields (‘semi-transparent’, 
between opaque and transparent, and ‘semi-hazy’, between transparent and hazy).  We encapsulate our 
findings in formal propositions. 
Case A 
Our analysis revealed that Case A was heavily dominated by the actions and beliefs of its 
executive management team and that the firm had undergone five definable event-driven phases or 
periods.  Twelve of Case A’s products/projects were included within the analysis presented in this 
paper, each product/project is typical of those analysed during the investigation.  Table 1 provides an 
overview of our analysis of Case A’s historical context and its five event driven phases: 
Variable 
 
Observation 
Organisational 
Field 
Transparency 
Threat 
Sensitivity 
Opportunity 
Sensitivity 
Resource 
Rigidities 
Routine 
Rigidities  
Historic context Opaque Low Low High High 
Phase 1 Semi-Transparent High Low Low High 
Phase 2 Hazy Low Low High High 
Phase 3 Semi-Hazy Low High High Low 
Phase 4 Transparent High High Low Low 
Phase 5 DISRUPTED - - - - 
Table 1. An overview of Case A’s historical context its five event driven phases. 
 
 > Historical Context: Blinkered and Disrupted - The business was eleven years old having been 
initially established by an American firm as a world-leading, technologically entrepreneurial 
manufacturer and core supplier.  For the three years before our interaction, Case A had operated 
independently from its founding parent organization following a management buy-out.  However, 
despite its innovative origins, both executive and operational managers had increasingly focused on 
better serving their parent organization’s needs with variations of the same core products hence, even 
with independence, Case A continued on a path to becoming a highly institutionalized commodities 
provider.  On meeting the management team for the first time, they demonstrated inflexibility to 
unfamiliar streams of business and were rarely subjected to conflicting expectations due to a lack of 
interaction with unfamiliar actors or organizations.  In fact, in the few months preceding our first 
meeting the case had been displaced from a sector of one of its core markets. 
 > Phase 1: Threat Perception Dominates - It was how executive managers in Case A responded 
to their lost market that provided the first definable event-driven phase of the case study - this was best 
described as ‘Threat Perception Dominates’.  A need to protect existing products and a need for new 
revenue streams had emerged and in response the executive management team, particularly the 
Director General, set out to broaden their networks and to challenge their firm's well established modes 
of working.  Exposure to new information gave executive managers a better view of potential threats 
and mitigating these threats soon topped their agenda.  However, new information did not translate into 
any change of action for operational managers.   
 > Phase 2: Information Overload -The term ‘Information Overload’ best describes the second 
event-driven phase of data collection.  As the potential of threats were communicated to all senior 
operational managers, the acknowledgement that more business could be lost increased; hence 
executive managers now explicitly tasked themselves with identifying new opportunities for new 
revenue streams.  However, more exposure to new networks and actors created high levels of 
uncertainty at the top of the firm.  The information overload experienced by the executive management 
combined with their dominance over corporate culture and the actions of employees resulted in 
uncertainly rippling throughout the business.  
 > Phase 3: Opportunity Perception Dominates - Case A entered its third definable phase - 
‘Opportunity Perception Dominates’ - as executive management began to make more sense of new 
information and new contacts.  The beginning of this phase witnessed executive managers working to 
consolidate their insights and attempting to communicate their findings with operational management.  
Despite the fact that operational managers now felt increasingly exposed to uncertainty, the 
communication exercise enhanced executive managers' understanding, which helped to further clarify 
emergent opportunities.  However, the new business ventures that now appropriated priority executive 
management attention novel technical opportunities, particularly those in new and unfamiliar markets.  
In fact, responding to discontinuous threats had stopped to feature on the managers’ agenda.   
 > Phase 4: Open Minded and Disrupting - The fourth definable phase of data collection 
witnessed Case A moving into an operational mode best described as ‘Open Minded and Disrupting’.  
The executive management team had adopted processes to normalize the act of identifying and 
assimilating new information from new and varied sources.  A large part of the normalization process 
was the adoption of new management tools, including a portfolio management and ideas management 
process, which better enabled the executive managers to see, validate and pursue both discontinuous 
threats and opportunities.  Although operational managers' understanding continued to lag, especially 
regarding the threats they were facing, they were increasingly developing a more comprehensive view 
of their firm’s operating context and its broader potential.   
 > Phase 5: Disrupted - The word ‘Disrupted’ best describes Case A’s final definable event 
driven phase.  The experience of the preceding four years had generated an executive management 
prediction that low-cost Chinese manufactures may take their core market within three to five years.  
This insight had provided the primary driver for the pioneering launch of a small series of high 
potential discontinuous new business ventures in the previous two phases.  However, the managers’ 
prediction proved to be optimistic: during the final months of our observations Case A’s largest 
customer of its core product category terminated its custom in favour of low-cost manufacturers in 
China.  Managers at all levels of the firm were therefore under-prepared for this discontinuous change.  
Moreover, their new business ventures were not yet substantial enough to compensate for such a loss of 
revenue or redundancy of staff and the firm was closed, segmented and its hardware and IP were sold.  
Products A2 and A3 are now manufactured and sold by another firm and both are beginning to show 
the early signs of generating market disruption. 
Case B 
Our analysis of Case B’s data is divided into four definable event-driven phases, throughout 
which the case was not dominated by the actions and beliefs of either one of its executive or 
operational management groups.  The primary influence over the dominant modes of working and the 
firm’s aggregate experience of organizational field transparency shifted between the two groups.  Nine 
of Case B’s products/projects were included within the analysis presented in this paper, each 
product/project is typical of those analysed during the investigation.  Table 2 provides an overview of 
our analysis of Case B’s historical context and its four event driven phases: 
Table 2. An overview of Case B’s historical context its four event driven phases. 
 
 > Historical Context: Blinkered and Disrupted - When we initiated our data collection, like Case 
A, Case B could be best described as ‘Blinkered and Disrupted’.  The firm had a high-tech, 
entrepreneurial history, it had been a global pioneer of a number of the sectors in which it operated and 
was still a dominant force in these now highly mature niche industries.  However, for the six years 
preceding the initiation of this research, Case B had become an increasingly regimented, rigid firm that 
had focused its operation within mature, well established markets.  For the last four years, priority was 
given to using its extensive but highly familiar network of suppliers and customers to focus upon 
driving efficiencies and incremental improvements from their 'cash cow' offerings.  Past success had 
blinded both operational and executive management to the threats posed to their existing products and 
opportunities for new revenue streams in unfamiliar markets and opportunities to use technologies that 
would be considered peripheral.  In the year before our observations began, Case B had suffered 
significant job losses when it lost a major contract to a competitor in what was described by a 
divisional R&D director as a “significant unforeseen disruption.” 
 > Phase 1: Information Overload and Sense-making - The first phase of data collection was 
defined by the impact of the managerial effort initiated to address the loss of a major section of Case 
B’s business as mentioned above.  This phase witnessed significant changes in strategy and 
management action and created a series of structural changes with deinstitutionalizing effects and was 
characterized by managers having to cope with massive ‘Information Overload and Sense-making’.  
Senior managers at all levels became motivated to increase their and their team's levels of interaction 
with wider networks of actors.  Operational managers were able to absorb many of these changes by 
using experimental approaches to rapidly making sense of their changing business environment; such 
Variable 
 
Observation 
Organisational 
Field 
Transparency 
Threat 
Sensitivity 
Opportunity 
Sensitivity 
Resource 
Rigidities 
Routine 
Rigidities  
Historic context Opaque Low Low High High 
Phase 1 Hazy Low Low High High 
Phase 2 Semi-Hazy Low High High Low 
Phase 3 Transparent High High Low Low 
Phase 4 Semi-Transparent High Low Low High 
improvisational action was seen to initiate organizational redesign via the identification of numerous 
discontinuous opportunities.  Conversely, the increased exposure to multiple and conflicting alternative 
practices and expectations was experienced as acutely uncomfortable by the executive management, 
who reported massive information overload and high levels of confusion.  The combination of these 
perspectives resulted in opportunities being overlooked or ignored, moreover, the vulnerability of Case 
B’s existing core products remained a difficult issue to consider or accept. 
 > Phase 2: Opportunity Perception Dominates - The second event-driven phase, best described 
as ‘Opportunity Perception Dominates’, is characterized by the normalization of higher levels of 
interaction with unfamiliar actors and networks and the ability to utilize the multiple conflicting 
expectations and insights that were consequently exerted on the firm.  In this phase, the development of 
more institutionalized processes and relationships began to improve the sense-making of managers at 
all levels and opportunities, especially those in new and unfamiliar markets, now seemed abundant.  
Operational managers had developed an innovation process that accounted for newly emerging 
institutional contexts, including an innovation team and a more formal but expansive 'ideas pipeline', 
which allowed them to make new forms of means, ends and means-ends calculations that improved 
their sensitivity to opportunities and threats.  Although the executive managements’ exposure to 
information overload was rapidly decreasing, they were still suffering the shock of change.  Hence they 
were now open to making sense of and embracing new opportunities for new revenue streams but 
remained very cautious of innovation output that involved, as the Finance Director stated, “messing 
around with proven products.”   
 > Phase 3: Open Minded and Seeding Disruption - Case B moved into it third definable phase, 
best described as ‘Open Minded and Seeding Disruption’, when new innovation routines were accepted 
and embraced by executive management.  Managers at all levels reported that they were able to see the 
vulnerabilities of their core products and also the opportunities for driving discontinuous change in 
both familiar and unfamiliar markets.  This phase was epitomized by the belief that there was a clear 
strength in the tension between the challenging information that was being received from outside actors 
and the new institutional structure of the firm. 
 > Phase 4: Loss of Insight - Threat Perception Dominates - The final phase of our observations 
was characterized by a ‘Loss of Insight and the Domination of Threat Perception’.  This phase began 
when a number of key operational managers left the firm in rapid succession.  These managers were 
reported to leave because of retirement or to work for unsanctioned spin-offs, where they could exploit 
the knowledge that they had gained from confronting a turbulent period and driving the emergence of 
new ventures.  Although the executive managers still felt they understood the challenges and 
opportunities that the firm faced, the remaining less experienced operational managers were not as well 
connected to important outside groups.  Consequently, a more formalized and rigid innovation process 
emerged to compensate for the decrease in interaction with external networks.  This focused the firm 
on reacting to discontinuous threats whilst reducing managers’ sensitivity to opportunities.  
 
Cross case analysis and formal propositions 
When responding to the perceived need for technological entrepreneurship, the leaders of Case 
A reacted more cautiously than the leaders of Case B.  In Case B, all executive and senior operational 
managers were tasked with establishing new networks and challenging ingrained assumptions, whereas 
in the Case A, responsibilities for such activities were exclusively those of the most senior managers in 
the firm.  Consequently, the managerial experience of organizational field transparency varied 
significantly between the cases throughout our investigation, as did the pattern and locus of influence 
within each firm.  However, comparisons of Tables 1 and 2 reveal that the dominant experience of field 
transparency engendered comparable conditions within both firms, with respect to managerial 
sensitivity to discontinuous threats and opportunities, and the inertia caused by routine and resource 
rigidities.  Moreover, deeper cross-case analyses revealed that it was the managerial sensitivity to 
discontinuous opportunities and threats that determined the strength and legitimacy of routine and 
resource rigidities.  We encapsulate these findings in the following five two-part propositions: 
Opaque Organizational Fields: Analyses of data gathered from the initial conditions of our 
investigation revealed that managers within cases A and B displayed a deep-set acceptance of norms, 
which had harnessed and focused action and maintained an opaque experience of organizational field 
transparency.  This was observed to have a powerful dampener on managerial sensitivity to both 
discontinuous threats and opportunities.  Moreover, it seems that it was this lack of visible 
opportunities and threats that underpinned the persistence of powerful resource and routine rigidities.  
These conditions are summarized in our first proposition: 
Proposition 1: 
(a) Managers who experience their organizational field as opaque will have a lack of sensitivity to 
changes in their organizational field which results in their failure to identify and respond to (i) 
discontinuous threats, and (ii) discontinuous opportunities. 
(b) Managers with a low sensitivity to discontinuous opportunities and threats, caused by 
organizational fields experienced as opaque, will face both: (i) powerful routine rigidities, and (ii) 
powerful resource rigidities. 
 Semi-transparent Organizational Fields: The management teams of both cases A and B 
experienced their organizational fields as semi-transparent at different points in time during our 
observations: Case A early on and Case B towards the end of the study.  Yet, in both cases, when 
managers experienced their organizational field as semi-transparent, they were focused upon driving 
efficiency and understanding and responding to discontinuous threats, whilst simultaneously displaying 
a limited managerial sensitivity to discontinuous opportunities.  Moreover, when managers are able to 
see discontinuous threats but not discontinuous opportunities, they were enabled to tackle their resource 
rigidities but their action remained trapped by routine rigidities.  These conditions are summarized in 
our second proposition: 
Proposition 2: 
(a) Managers who experience their organizational field as semi-transparent will be (i) sensitive to 
changes in their organizational field which expose discontinuous threats, and (ii) insensitive to changes 
in their organizational field which expose discontinuous opportunities. 
(b) Managers with a low sensitivity to discontinuous opportunities and a high sensitivity to 
discontinuous threats will be able to overcome resource rigidities but routine rigidities will continue to 
constrain action. 
 Transparent Organizational Fields: We observed that managers who reported experiencing their 
organizational fields as transparent, were able to see both discontinuous threats and discontinuous 
opportunities.  Moreover, managers who were able to see both discontinuous opportunities and threats 
were observed tackling both their resource and routine rigidities - although success was very much still 
dependent upon generating enough organizational momentum to support their insights.  These 
conditions are summarized in our third proposition: 
Proposition 3: 
(a) Managers who experience their organizational field as transparent will be sensitive to changes in 
their organizational field that expose (i) discontinuous threats, and (ii) discontinuous opportunities. 
(b) Managers with a high sensitivity to discontinuous opportunities threats will be able to overcome 
both resource rigidities and routine rigidities, if they can create enough organizational momentum to 
support the change. 
 Semi-Hazy Organizational Fields: In semi-hazy organizational fields, managers’ awareness of 
discontinuous opportunities, especially those in unfamiliar markets, is high, yet a multitude of new 
referents combined with a reduction in institutionalization blinds them from discontinuous threats 
closer to home.  Moreover, in such an environment routine rigidities are challenged, often illicitly, and 
especially for new market explorations, but resource dependencies take effect due the lack of definitive 
means-ends calculations, including resource rigidities.  These conditions are summarized in our fourth 
proposition: 
Proposition 4: 
(a) Managers who experience their organizational field as semi-hazy will be (i) sensitive to changes in 
their organizational field which expose discontinuous opportunities, and (ii) insensitive to changes in 
their organizational field which expose discontinuous threats. 
(b) Managers in a semi-hazy field, with a high sensitivity to discontinuous opportunities and a low 
sensitivity to discontinuous threats, will be able to overcome routine rigidities but resource rigidities 
will continue in the absence of comprehensive sense-making.  
 Hazy Organizational Fields: A hazy experience of organizational field transparency was 
observed to have a powerful dampener on managerial sensitivity to both discontinuous threats and 
opportunities, and in the absence of better alternatives, managers maintain familiar patterns of 
behaviour and resources investment patterns.  These conditions are summarized in our fifth 
proposition: 
Proposition 5: 
(a) Managers who experience their organizational field as hazy, will have a lack of sensitivity to (i) 
discontinuous threats, and (ii) discontinuous opportunities. 
(b) Managers with a low sensitivity to discontinuous opportunities and threats, caused by organization 
fields experienced as hazy, will revert to familiar patterns of action, in the absence of obviously better 
alternatives, and will consequently face both (i) powerful routine rigidities, and (ii) powerful resource 
rigidities. 
1 2 3 4 4
HC Opaque:
"We had bought-out the operations and were so focused on maximizing our 
links and profits to our mother company that we doubled our efforts at aligning 
our processes and improving efficiency and didn't really stop to think about 
what was going on in the world outside, looking back, I guess it was sort of 
naive... " [Director General]
Product A1
 [no decisions led to the product being 
disrupted]
x
Project A1
[project initiated to mitigate disruptive threat 
then terminated as incongruent with business]
x(i) x(ii)
Competitor Product A1
[no prior knowledge and no prior attempt to 
look outside traditional markets led to no 
action]
x
Project A2
[Project established following advice from 
their network then suspended as it was not 
seen as core activity]
x(i) x(ii)
Project A3
[Project established following identification 
of new technological potential]
x
Project A2.1
[clandestine decision taken by executive 
managers to advance Project A2]
x
Project A3.1
[decision taken to advance Project A3] x
Project A4
[clandestine decision taken by CEO to 
resurrect a personal project]
x
Project A5
[clandestine decision taken by CEO to 
resurrect a personal project]
x(i) x(ii)
Product A2
[decision taken to develop Project 2.1 into a 
pre exploitable offering]
x
Product A3
[decision taken to develop Project 4 into a pre 
exploitable offering]
x
Project A6
[decision taken to exist core product industry] x
HC Opaque:
"… we were just getting on with things like we had done for years… we'd got 
used to being the best and to being very secretive about what we did… I'd 
occasionally visit with outsiders, but it was often at my own cost… [Senior 
Engineer]
Product B1
[decisions taken to improve product beyond 
customer demand led to it being disrupted by 
a simpler offering]
x
Product B2
[Product nearly disrupted by aggressive 
supplier, saved by last minute negotiation]
x
Project B1
[Project established following insight into a 
market need then suspended as it was not 
seen as core activity]
x(i) x(ii)
Project B2
[launched to address performance over-
supply issues]
x
Product B3(a and b)
[the continuous improvement of Product B3 
left it vulnerable to a low-end disruption]
x
Project B3
[the established to leverage value from a new 
market using an under-utilised but proven 
technology' later 'frozen' to  perception of 
risk]
x(i) x(ii)
Product B4
[Case B's network allowed the firm to 
capitalise of regulatory changes before they 
were formally announced]
x
Project B3.1
[the re-launch of Project B3 due to a better 
understanding of the process of discontinuous 
innovation]
x
4 Semi-transparent:
"We've lost the head of our innovation team, and quite a number of the gang 
who've been pushing the innovation agenda at our level… off to pursue pastures 
new... I don't know about the others here but I feel a bit lost. … we've created a 
more formal ideas pipeline for decision making but it feels like we're missing 
something... perhaps even narrowed our focus" [Senior Technologist]
Product B5
[new managers raised doubts about new 
markets - stalling product launch]
x
B
A
Type of Product/ProjectCase Event 
driven 
phase
Evidence of Organisational Field Transparency Example Project/Product Reference
Hazy:
"To conclude, our business is in a high state of flux… we not only have to better 
understand our customers but also our potential customers… we have to 
understand what's going on at the periphery... it may challenge many of our 
accepted wisdoms... but we cannot take decisions lightly… we must make great 
efforts to make sense of our fast changing environment" [Memo to all OM and 
EM from top EM]
Semi-hazy:
"Since we set up this new innovation team, we've stopped talking about new 
developments to just anyone, now we make sure we talk to the right people... 
we've put some really useful processes in place to help give shape to new ideas 
and to make selection easier... I just wish that 'upstairs' [the executive managers] 
would be more prepared to accept what we say and give us some more 
resources" [Head of Innovation Team]
Transparent:
"... the use of a portfolio management approach by our new innovation team has 
helped us formalize our decision making process which in turn has given us 
more confidence... we've stopped constantly seeking more advice to make sense 
of the chaos we've faced... It really feel like this business is back in action..." 
[Dep CEO]
1
2
3
4
3
2
1
Semi-Transparent:
"For the first time we are talking to new groups of people and we're scared… it's 
become obvious to us that losing these [Product A1] customers is the sign of 
things to come.  But what can we do? Our whole company is set up to operate in 
a particular way... the very processes that distinguished us from the rest are now 
starting to strangle us... we can see it, but how we'll communicate this to change 
on our shop floor I don't know..." [Head of R&D]
Hazy:
"… we used a number of methods to show our [OM] guys the extent of the 
threats that we face [in our major product areas]… after they came to terms with 
what this meant, they've addressed our cost cutting and stream lining with a real 
passion... we've [the EM] been focused on looking around the world for new 
opportunities... but there's so much information and so many areas where we 
could contribute that its hard to know where to start... we spend more time than 
ever challenging our processes and trying to make sense of unfamiliar markets.  
Sure, its exciting but how do you know where to make the gamble - risk is a 
major issue right now." [General Manager]
Semi-Hazy:
"My instinct is to tell you that we're talking to more people then ever, but in 
reality, we're probably talking to just as many, only now more  information 
makes sense… it's been a sharp learning curve for us [the EM] but we've 
changed the way we work and can now see that the world should be our 
oyster... my big problem is still challenging the way things are done on the shop 
floor." [Director General]
Transparent:
"The boss had got a little out of control… he was trying to change everything… 
now we've adapted our old [new product development] process to incorporate 
some of his new thinking it makes sense - we get it... they've [the EM] used 
these portfolio maps to explain why we need to address our bias towards 
improving [our core product categories]... and we now have a pipeline which 
has speeded things up and tells us where to go for good info." [Day-shift 
Manager]
 
Key:   1 = a product owned by the case that was disrupted/significantly impacted by a missed opportunity/threat.   /   2 = a live 
project - initiated to develop and exploit a discontinuous opportunity   /   3 = a live project - initiated to mitigate a discontinuous 
threat.   /   4 = a terminated or 'frozen' project - originally initiated to develop (or mitigate) a discontinuous opportunity (or 
threat).   /   5 = a product with discontinuous potential that was missed or overlooked by the case - now exploited by a competitor.  
/  (i) / (ii) = (i) indicates initiatives initial position within the phase and (ii) its eventual position.   /   EM = Executive 
management; OM = Operational Management 
Figure 2. A within case analysis data summary. 
DISCUSSION 
This paper presents an important variation in managerial behaviour and implications for theory 
that have hitherto not been explored or described within the literature regarding discontinuous 
innovation, organisational inertia, entrepreneurship and institutional theory.  Moreover, should further 
research allow us to prove our propositions to be generalisable, our findings will have immediate 
implications for technology entrepreneurs and those responsible for driving their firm’s innovation 
effort.  Specifically, our research serves to modify the existing understanding of organizational inertia 
via findings that are both consistent and inconsistent with extant literature.  We do not reject the recent 
developments in the field, such as those proposed by Gilbert (2005), instead we provide boundary 
conditions or a set of situations to which such work is more applicable.  We contend that prior research 
fails to deal adequately with the experience of organizational field transparency, specifically the 
mechanisms of multiplicity and institutionalization.  By initiating research to bridge this gap, we can 
build on world-class research by more precisely defining a broader categorization of contexts in which 
managers will find themselves in the face of discontinuous opportunities and threats.  Specifically, the 
conceptual approach developed in this paper combines the traditional perspectives from the theory of 
resource dependence, the growing support for the notion of a routine-based view of the firm and the 
well established foundations of institutional theory to provide a more complete explanation of 
organizational inertia in the context of discontinuous change.  Using a longitudinal approach, the 
characteristics and prevalence of organizational inertia have been shown to vary directly with the 
degree of organizational field transparency experienced by the managers involved.  We show that the 
degree of multiplicity and institutionalization experienced within a firm influences managers' 
experience of organizational field transparency.  The degree of organizational field transparency can 
therefore be categorized into at least five dominant forms, all of which were shown to affect resource 
rigidities and routine rigidities - the two key determinants of inertia - to different extents.  To this end 
we have delivered a novel conceptual progression that is both descriptively more valid and 
explanatorily more informing.  In sum, our efforts to advance understand of incumbent inertia have 
produced a conceptual progression that has allowed us to generate propositions not exposed by 
previous conceptualizations.  We suggest that these create a more informed basis for future empirical 
research and must now be thoroughly tested.  
Furthermore, our analyses revealed that the managers’ experience of organizational field 
transparency varied throughout our investigation.  Although the stories of both cases are different and 
although neither progressed in exactly the same fashion, there was a similarity in the reaction of both 
cases when moving from their initially highly institutionalized states.  The organizational field 
transparency experienced by managers in both cases was observed to quickly swing from opaque to 
hazy and then to migrate, through a period of sense-making, into a more transparent position.  Yet it is 
unlikely that managers in either case were interacting with more, or more diverse, institutional 
constituents in their hazy phase than they were when they reported their fields as transparent.  Instead, 
managers in the latter phase were simply more capable of dealing with conflicting and diverse 
information.  Thus, our assessments of organisational field transparency do not translate into objective 
measures of formal institutional structures or constituent multiplicity, in terms of the physical size and 
diversity of the managers networks.  Instead, our analysis of organisational fields within the cases 
reflects the very personal nature of organisational field transparency, reflecting the strength of the 
subjective measures that were employed in this study.  Therefore, whilst we suspect that managers can 
create information overload and hazy organizational fields with unbearably large and overly diverse, 
suboptimal networks, they can also suffer similar strains purely on the basis of being unfamiliar with 
exposing themselves to conflicting expectations and alternatives for the first time.  Moreover, the 
importance of sense-making activities in the progression from hazy to transparent organizational fields 
provides further support for Weick’s (2005) contention that managerial sense-making practices are an 
integral enabler of experimental activities resulting in organizational redesign  Our case studies 
demonstrate that sense-making in non-institutionalised fields can help to increase sensitivity to 
discontinuous opportunities and to overcome resource rigidities that constrain the pursuit of 
discontinuous technological entrepreneurship. 
Resource and access constraints prevented us from exploring the full richness of the managers 
involved in the study beyond that of their formal and occasional informal business activities.  It may 
have proved useful to consider their positions within and relations to external structures stretching 
beyond the case study sites (Wittington, 1992).  However, in a bid to not entirely overlook the 
complexity and diversity of the different actors involved in the case studies, we divided the participants 
from each case study site into two core groups – executive and operational managers.  Whilst we 
touched upon how these groups influenced (or dominated as in Case A) their firms’ aggregate 
organisational field transparency, we believe that further analysis of this distinction will help to further 
refine our above contributions.  Moreover, further studies may eventually be able to help better 
understand the emergence of an organisationally dominant experience of organisational field 
transparency -  in particular, which managerial views are more influential, at what times in the 
organisation’s life cycle and in which industries 
Finally, we would like to acknowledge an element of luck in our study.  We clearly found 
ourselves in the ‘right place at the right time’ with the ‘right cases studies,’ in that they both suffered 
significant change and both displayed significant resilience during this time.  Therefore, we accept that 
our insights may be difficult to replicate in the future with such a small sample of firms. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper set out to sharpen the conception of how and why organizational inertia inhibits the 
pursuit of discontinuous innovation, in an attempt to offering a more informed basis for future 
empirical research.  Specifically it investigated how the managerial experience organizational field 
transparency influences (1) the perception of discontinuous threats and opportunities and (2) the 
different determinants of inertia.  To this end, mangers in opaque organisational fields were observed to 
consistently fail to respond to discontinuous opportunities and threats, and they were bound by intense 
levels of both resource and routine rigidities - the two key determinants of inertia.  In semi-transparent 
fields, discontinuous opportunities remained mostly over looked, yet the threat of potential 
discontinuities became more apparent; this helped managers to overcome resource rigidities although 
inertia remained through routine rigidities.  The experience of an organizational field as transparent 
allowed managers to overcome both determinants of organizational inertia as they could better perceive 
and understand the threats and opportunities of potential discontinuities.  In semi-hazy organizational 
fields, managers’ exposure to a multitude of new referents enabled them to be highly aware of 
discontinuous opportunities in unfamiliar markets but blinded them from discontinuous threats closer to 
home.  In this semi-hazy condition managers were able to tackle routine rigidities, especially for new 
market explorations, but resource rigidities maintained the inertia of the organization.  Organizational 
fields experienced as hazy were experienced as highly uncertain; managers' concentration on sense-
making inhibited the perception of threats and opportunities and maintained organizational inertia.  
This paper encapsulates its findings as new testable propositions hitherto unexposed by previous 
conceptualizations.  Therefore, we contend that our investigation offers a novel conceptual progression 
that is both descriptively more valid and explanatorily more informing, in that it offers a better fit with 
reality as we know it to be.  This more informed basis for future empirical research must now be 
thoroughly tested.  Finally, this paper creates a call for more scholarly attention to be given to the 
influence of organisational field transparency; in particular we espouse its potential value as a tool for 
dealing with heterogeneity in entrepreneurship and innovation research. 
 
NOTES 
[1] This research presented in this paper would not have been possible without the initial support of Disrupt-it 
Project (a €3million project co-funded by the Information Society Technologies Commission under the 5th 
Framework Program of the European Union). 
[2] Although resources are often defined as including stocks of knowledge, skills, financial assets, physical 
assets, human capital and other tangible and intangible factors (Wernerfelt, 1984; Amit and Shoemaker, 1993), our 
primarily consideration is given here to financial and attention-based resources. 
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